Whitepaper 04 · Asset-based lending and private creditVerifying receivables and collateral: lessons for lenders from the First Brands collapse.

A company with about $5 billion in annual sales filed for bankruptcy declaring $12 million in cash and more than $9 billion in liabilities. Prosecutors allege fake invoices and collateral pledged two and three times. This paper sets out how receivables and inventory financing can be deceived, what the Uniform Commercial Code does and does not tell you, and a verification program built on evidence the borrower does not control.

Read the executive summary

A long warehouse aisle between tall racks of stock
Fraud Examination ServiceFES-WP-04
Written for
Asset-based lenders, private credit funds, factors, supply-chain finance providers and their counsel
Scope
U.S. secured lending; UCC Article 9 with Florida references; First Brands, Tricolor and Greensill
Current to
November 11, 2026 / 20 min read

Executive summary

Receivables and inventory lending rests on two facts: the collateral exists, and no one else has a prior claim to it. First Brands Group is alleged to have broken both at scale, and the case is a reminder that borrowing base certificates, financing statements and even audited statements are the borrower’s representations, not proof.13

This whitepaper explains the main receivables and inventory structures, the fraud patterns that exploit each one, the Article 9 rules on perfection and priority and the practical limits of a UCC search. It then lays out a verification program drawn from the OCC’s examination guidance and the PCAOB’s confirmation standard, with exhibits a credit team can use on its next deal or field exam.819

Key findings

  1. 01

    Labels are not evidence

    A borrowing base, a true-sale opinion or a clean lien search tells you how a deal is papered, not whether the invoices are real or unencumbered.

  2. 02

    The servicer is the weak point

    When the borrower collects customer payments for the financier, a diversion can run for weeks before anyone sees it. At First Brands, collections to one fund stopped on September 15, 2025.

  3. 03

    UCC searches have blind spots

    Searches are name-based and state-based. Insider-owned entities, SPVs and misnamed filings can sit outside the results.

  4. 04

    Third-party evidence decides

    Confirmations sent and received by the lender, carrier records and cash traced to specific invoices are far harder to fake than borrower files.

  5. 05

    Off-balance-sheet layers must be mapped

    Factoring, supply-chain finance and SPV funding can be legitimate, but each financier sees only its own deal unless someone reconciles them all.

Collateral no one independently verified.

First Brands Group was an automotive aftermarket supplier selling replacement brakes, filters, wipers and lights under various brand names. On September 28, 2025, it filed for bankruptcy. Federal prosecutors say it reported about $5 billion in net annual sales but declared just $12 million in its corporate bank accounts and more than $9 billion in liabilities.1

$5Breported net annual sales
$12Mcash in corporate accounts at bankruptcy
$9B+liabilities at bankruptcy
$2.3Binvoice-based liabilities alleged in the company’s own suit

Source: U.S. Attorney, S.D.N.Y.1; Reuters5

The indictment unsealed on January 29, 2026 charges founder Patrick James and his brother Edward James with wire fraud, bank fraud and money laundering conspiracy, and charges Patrick James with running a continuing financial crimes enterprise. Prosecutors allege schemes to fake and inflate invoices for receivables and payables, double- and triple-pledge loan collateral, falsify financial statements and conceal liabilities from lenders.1 The company’s own lawsuit, filed in November 2025, alleges at least $2.3 billion in liabilities based at least in significant part on non-existent or doctored invoices.5

These are allegations. Two former executives have pleaded guilty: Peter Andrew Brumbergs in January 2026 and former chief financial officer Stephen Graham in March 2026, who told the court he knew the financial statements given to lenders contained false and misleading information.16 Both brothers pleaded not guilty and, as of October 2026, were scheduled for trial in February 2027, each planning to blame the other.7 The bankruptcy was converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation on September 1, 2026.3

Debt you could see, and debt you could not

At filing, First Brands disclosed about $6.1 billion of on-balance-sheet funded debt, including an asset-based loan, plus about $2.3 billion of off-balance-sheet financing through special-purpose vehicles, about $800 million of unsecured supply-chain financing and about $2.3 billion of factoring liabilities.2 A later review of the case noted that these categories were not additive and were not characterized consistently, so no single view reconciled the obligations.3

Exhibit 1First Brands financing disclosed at filing, by type (billions of U.S. dollars)
  • On-balance-sheet funded debt (incl. ABL)$6.1B
  • Off-balance-sheet SPV financing$2.3B
  • Factoring liabilities$2.3B
  • Unsecured supply-chain financing$0.8B

Categories as disclosed in the first-day filings. They overlap and should not be added together.

Source: Willkie Farr and Gallagher2; Nelson Mullins3

One disclosure shows exactly where the structure was exposed. Jefferies said its Point Bonita fund had about $715 million invested in First Brands receivables, almost entirely owed by Walmart, AutoZone, NAPA, O’Reilly and Advance Auto Parts. First Brands acted as servicer, responsible for directing those customers’ payments to the fund. On September 15, 2025, it stopped doing so.4

A transaction label cannot prove that collateral exists.

Nelson Mullins, on the First Brands conversion3

Our First Brands case study sets out the timeline and the bankruptcy in more detail. This paper is about the controls.

How receivables and inventory financing works.

Working-capital lenders advance money against assets that turn into cash: unpaid customer invoices (accounts receivable) and goods held for sale (inventory). The structures differ mainly in who owns the receivable, who collects the cash and how closely the financier watches it.

The borrowing base

The OCC describes asset-based lending as a relationship in which the lender closely controls credit availability and collateral, using a borrowing-base formula derived by multiplying the value of eligible collateral by an advance rate, controlling cash receipts and carrying out field audits.8 Borrowers certify the borrowing base on a schedule, from daily to monthly, and agings show each customer balance by age.8

Eligibility rules do much of the protective work. The OCC notes that accounts are usually treated as ineligible when they exceed three times the payment terms (90 days for 30-day terms); that under “cross-aging” all of one customer’s accounts become ineligible once a set share of them, commonly 10 percent, is delinquent; and that affiliate receivables and contra accounts (where the customer is also a supplier and can set off) are normally excluded.8 Inventory gets lower advance rates because goods must still be finished, sold and paid for.8

Factoring, supply-chain finance and off-balance-sheet structures

In third-party factoring, the company sells its receivables at a discount to a financier and passes on the customer payments. Nonrecourse factoring that qualifies as a true sale may not appear as debt on the seller’s balance sheet. In customer-led or supplier financing, a financier aligned with the customer buys the supplier’s invoices and the customer pays the financier directly. In supply-chain or reverse factoring, the company arranges for its own suppliers to be paid early by a financier, and the company pays the financier later.2

Accounts sold to a factor are typically excluded from an asset-based lender’s borrowing base to avoid double counting.2 That exclusion only works if the lender knows which accounts were sold, which is exactly the information a fraudulent borrower controls.

Exhibit 2Common working-capital structures and where verification matters
StructureWhat the financier relies onWho collects the cashWhere fraud hides
Asset-based revolverBorrowing base certificate, agings, inventory reports, field examsIdeally the lender, through a lockbox or blocked accountFictitious or ineligible accounts in the aging; inventory that is overstated or already pledged
Secured financing (lighter monitoring)Periodic agings and officer certificationsUsually the borrower, with full access to receiptsCertifications that are never tested against source records
Third-party factoringInvoice schedules and the borrower’s representationsOften the borrower, as servicerThe same invoice sold twice; collections not forwarded
Supply-chain (reverse) factoringThe buyer’s approval of supplier invoicesBuyer pays the financier at maturityApproved invoices that overstate or invent purchases; debt that looks like trade payables
Off-balance-sheet SPV or inventory facilityTransfer documents and SPV reportingVaries; sometimes an affiliateAssets that never left the parent, or are also in the senior lender’s collateral

Descriptions are general; actual documents control. The OCC also defines a lighter-touch “blanket receivables” category with no borrowing base.

Source: OCC Comptroller’s Handbook8; Willkie Farr and Gallagher2

Six patterns that defeat a borrowing base.

The OCC’s handbook, written for bank examiners, names the core risks in one sentence: a fraudulent borrower can submit falsified sales and collection documentation, use the same receivables as collateral with more than one lender, divert cash or collateral proceeds, misrepresent purchase orders or overstate inventory levels.8 The First Brands indictment alleges versions of nearly all of them.1

1. Fictitious or inflated invoices

Prosecutors allege that First Brands employees routinely submitted fake, inflated and double-pledged invoices to factoring counterparties. In some instances invoices were generated for transactions that never occurred; in others the dollar amounts were altered.1

2. Double-pledged receivables and inventory

The same asset is pledged or sold to two or more financiers, each of whom believes it holds the claim. The indictment alleges collateral was double- and triple-pledged, and that entities owned by Patrick James pledged inventory to off-sheet lenders as unencumbered when it was already subject to the senior lenders’ liens and remained on First Brands’ balance sheet.1

3. Round-tripping

Funds are cycled so that financing looks like trade or customer cash. Prosecutors allege First Brands induced payables financiers to advance more than suppliers were owed and diverted a portion back to itself, transactions referred to internally as “round trips.” Separately, off-sheet loan proceeds were allegedly routed through a collections entity outside the corporate structure so that they looked like ordinary customer receipts.1

4. Diverted remittances

Where the borrower services the receivables it sold, it can keep the customers’ payments. Under the Receivables Purchase Agreement filed in the bankruptcy, First Brands was required to forward collections to the factor within a set period and did not.2 Article 9 explains why this works: an account debtor may discharge its obligation by paying the assignor until it receives an authenticated notification that the account has been assigned.18

5. Commingled collections

When collections for several financiers land in one borrower-controlled account, no single financier can tie its receipts to its invoices. Willkie’s review warns that an account merely subject to control, or that relies on the company to forward proceeds, may not be enough.2

6. Inventory that does not exist, or is not free

Inventory can be overstated, obsolete or already pledged. The OCC also cautions examiners to analyze a borrower’s switch between FIFO and LIFO inventory accounting, because it can conceal inventory and operating problems.8

Exhibit 3Fraud pattern, verification test and independent data source
Fraud patternVerification testIndependent data source
Fictitious invoicesPositive confirmation of selected invoices; match invoice to purchase order and proof of deliveryCustomer accounts payable records; carrier bills of lading and tracking data
Inflated invoice amountsCompare invoice values to the customer’s confirmed balance and to subsequent cash received for each invoiceConfirmation responses; bank remittance detail
Double-pledged receivablesFresh UCC searches on every entity; disclosure covenant for all factoring and SCF programs; duplicate-invoice tests across financiersFiling-office records; other financiers’ schedules obtained under estoppel or intercreditor rights
Round-trippingTrace large receipts to their originating payer; test whether “customer” cash comes from customersBank statements and wire detail obtained directly from the bank
Diverted remittancesReconcile collections expected from the aging to cash received in the controlled account; monitor days to remitLockbox or blocked-account reports from the depository bank
Commingled collectionsRequire segregated accounts per financier; test sweeps dailyAccount control agreements; bank-generated sweep reports
Phantom or encumbered inventoryPhysical test counts; tie perpetual records to receiving and shipping logs; lien search on affiliates and warehousesThird-party warehouse confirmations; appraisers; filing-office records
Related-party salesScreen customers and vendors against ownership and address data; exclude affiliate accountsCorporate registries; beneficial ownership records; borrower’s own disclosures tested against them

Each test relies on evidence that originates outside the borrower. Where only borrower-generated evidence is available, treat the result as unverified.

Source: OCC Comptroller’s Handbook8; PCAOB AS 231019; Willkie Farr and Gallagher2

None of these patterns is new. Our whitepaper on small-business embezzlement covers the same concealment logic at the scale of a single bookkeeper; the difference here is that the people concealing are the owners, who can override every control.

Perfection, priority and the limits of a UCC search.

Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs security interests in personal property, and it also covers outright sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles and promissory notes.9 That second point matters for factoring: a buyer of receivables generally has to perfect its interest just as a lender does. The general rule is that a financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests, subject to listed exceptions.10

Under §9-322(a)(2), a perfected security interest beats an unperfected one.11 A financing statement is sufficient if it names the debtor and the secured party and indicates the collateral, and it may be filed before any security agreement exists.13 The practical consequence: a financier who files first can take priority even over one who lent first, and a search can show a filing for a deal that was never closed.

Where to search

The law of the jurisdiction where the debtor is located generally governs perfection and priority, and a registered organization, such as a corporation or LLC, is located in the state under whose law it was organized.1415 A Delaware LLC operating in Ohio is searched in Delaware.

What a clean search does not tell you

  • Who else is in the group. Filings are indexed by debtor name. An SPV, a sister company or an entity owned by the founder is a different debtor. First Brands’ alleged off-sheet inventory financing ran through entities owned by Patrick James that were nominally separate from the company.1
  • Misnamed filings. A filing that does not sufficiently provide the debtor’s correct name is seriously misleading unless the filing office’s standard search logic, run on the correct name, would still disclose it.16 Searches under name variants are worth the cost.
  • Amounts and status. The financing statement need only indicate the collateral.13 It does not say how much is owed or which invoices were sold.
  • Lapse. A filed financing statement is effective for five years and lapses unless continued; on lapse the security interest becomes unperfected.17 The OCC tells banks to keep a tickler system for continuations and to run periodic lien searches, particularly to uncover purchase-money interests and tax liens that can take priority.8

Law firms reviewing First Brands make the same point from the other side: close the title and lien chain at closing, confirm every SPV transfer and release, and draft debt definitions to capture recourse, repurchase obligations and retained servicing.3 A search is a necessary test, not a sufficient one.

A verification program built on outside evidence.

The OCC calls field audits integral to controlling receivables and inventory lending and says they help detect fraud. Field auditors should obtain written account verifications, physically inspect collateral, examine original invoices and supporting documents, and review credit memos for reasonableness and accuracy. Audits should be done before an account is booked and at least annually, quarterly or monthly if risk dictates, and weekly in a high-risk or workout relationship.8

Direct confirmation with account debtors

The auditing profession’s confirmation standard is a useful model for lenders, even though it is written for auditors rather than lenders. Amended PCAOB AS 2310, effective for fiscal years ending on or after June 15, 2025, requires the auditor to select the items, send the requests and receive the responses directly, so that information cannot be intercepted or altered.19 Its key ideas translate directly to a field exam:

  • Use positive requests. Negative confirmations alone do not provide sufficient evidence; blank forms that ask the customer to state the balance may be more reliable than forms that state it.19
  • Address the right person, and consider any information about the respondent’s objectivity or incentives.19
  • Treat a response from an unexpected address, without identification, or routed through the company as suspect; if it goes to anyone other than you, ask the customer to resend it directly.19
  • For non-responses, perform alternative procedures: subsequent cash receipts matched to the invoices paid, shipping documents and purchase orders or contracts.19

Cash dominion and collections

In most asset-based relationships, payments go to the lender or to a lockbox it controls, which lets the lender monitor receivables and cash continuously and reduces fraud risk. The OCC notes that some lenders notify customers that they control payments, but most do not.8 Given §9-406, notification is what stops a customer from discharging its debt by paying the borrower.18 Practitioners recommend a dedicated lockbox or exclusively controlled account, daily sweeps, and never letting the borrower be the sole servicer.2

Dilution, aging and analytics

Dilution is the reduction of receivables by returns, allowances, disputes, bad debts and other non-cash credits, and the OCC says it usually runs at 5 percent or less of receivables. Lenders should analyze trends and changes in dilution, and field auditors should test selected credit memos.8 Simple analytics catch a great deal: invoice numbers out of sequence, round amounts, invoices dated just before a borrowing base date, customers whose balances grow while their payments do not, and collections that do not match the expected run-off of the aging.

The ACFE’s 2026 study found financial statement fraud in only 6 percent of cases but with a median loss of $1 million, the highest of any scheme type; frauds by owners and executives had a median loss of $475,000 and lasted a median 23 months. External audit was the initial detection method in about 2 percent of cases.20 Lenders should not assume someone else has tested the numbers.

Exhibit 4A five-stage receivables and collateral verification program
  1. 01

    Map the structure

    Obtain every factoring, SCF, SPV and inventory facility across the group; reconcile them to the consolidated accounts and the borrowing base.

  2. 02

    Search and document

    Run UCC, tax lien and judgment searches on every entity, affiliate and name variant; close the lien and title chain at funding.

  3. 03

    Test the assets

    Confirm selected invoices directly with customers; match to purchase orders and carrier records; count inventory and confirm third-party warehouses.

  4. 04

    Control the cash

    Lockbox or blocked account, account control agreement, daily sweeps, customer notification where feasible, read-only bank and ERP access.

  5. 05

    Monitor and escalate

    Track dilution, aging, days to remit and confirmation exceptions; set triggers for an unscheduled field exam or a forensic review.

Frequency should follow risk. The OCC contemplates monthly or weekly field work in high-risk and workout relationships.

Source: OCC Comptroller’s Handbook8; PCAOB AS 231019; Nelson Mullins3

Related parties and system access

Affiliate receivables can increase the potential for fraud, particularly in times of financial stress, which is why they are usually ineligible.8 Screen customers, suppliers and SPV counterparties against ownership, officer and address data, and test whether any “customer” shares an owner with the borrower. Read-only access to the borrower’s ERP and bank accounts, and audit escalation rights, let a lender trace assets and cash without relying on management.3

Exhibit 5Closing and field-exam document request
  • Organization chart of every legal entity, SPV and insider-owned affiliate that buys from, sells to or finances the borrower
  • All receivables purchase, factoring, supply-chain finance and inventory financing agreements, with current outstanding balances
  • Detailed aging by customer and invoice, reconciled to the general ledger and the last three borrowing base certificates
  • Invoice-level data with purchase order numbers, ship dates, carrier and tracking or bill of lading numbers
  • Credit memo register for the past 12 months, with approvals
  • Bank statements for every account, obtained directly from the banks, and account control agreements
  • UCC, tax lien and judgment search results for each entity and name variant, with any releases
  • Inventory perpetual records, last physical count results and third-party warehouse confirmations
  • Related-party transaction schedule, tested against corporate registry and ownership records

Ask for data in native electronic form. A borrower that cannot or will not produce invoice-level detail is giving you information.

Tricolor, Greensill and what regulators noticed.

Tricolor (2025)

First Brands was not alone. On September 10, 2025, Tricolor Holdings, a subprime auto lender, filed for Chapter 7. An indictment unsealed in December 2025 charges its founder and chief executive, Daniel Chu, and other executives with schemes to double-pledge collateral to multiple lenders and manipulate collateral characteristics so that ineligible, near-worthless loans appeared to meet lender requirements. Prosecutors allege that by about August 2025 Tricolor had pledged about $2.2 billion of collateral but had only about $1.4 billion of real collateral, and that its largest lenders were owed more than $900 million at the bankruptcy.21 These charges are allegations.21

Exhibit 6Tricolor: collateral pledged versus real collateral, about August 2025 (billions of U.S. dollars, as alleged)
  • Collateral pledged to lenders and investors$2.2B
  • Real collateral$1.4B
  • Alleged bogus collateral$0.8B

Figures are prosecutors’ allegations in the indictment; they have not been proved at trial.

Source: U.S. Attorney, S.D.N.Y.21

Greensill Capital (2021)

Greensill is a different lesson: the receivable did not yet exist. The UK House of Commons Treasury Committee described lending against “prospective receivables,” based on an expectation that some future invoice could be issued rather than on an invoice for a specific purchase, and concluded that it would appear to be a significantly riskier form of lending than traditional supply chain finance. The committee also identified a heavy concentration of exposure to the GFG Alliance.22 If the collateral is a forecast, there is nothing to confirm.

The supervisors’ view

The Federal Reserve’s November 2025 Financial Stability Report said the bankruptcies of an auto parts supplier and a subprime auto lender appeared to be isolated events, but highlighted that unexpected losses could arise from opaque off-balance-sheet funding arrangements used by some privately held firms.23 The OCC’s handbook states the older truth plainly: fraud is a leading cause of loss in both secured lending and asset-based lending, and regular collateral monitoring and timely field audits are the best deterrent.8

Exhibit 7Warning signs in a receivables or inventory borrower
  • Inspection resistance

    Delays or refusals of field exams, site visits or customer contact. First Brands allegedly prevented lenders from inspecting collateral.

  • Borrower as sole servicer

    All customer payments flow to the borrower, which forwards them later; remittance lags lengthen.

  • Collections out of step

    Cash received does not match the run-off of the prior aging, or “customer” receipts arrive from unexpected payers.

  • Dilution spikes

    Credit memos jump, especially just after a borrowing base date, or exceed the historical range.

  • Concentration

    A few large customers or one related group make up most of the eligible base.

  • Unexplained entities

    SPVs, collection companies or inventory buyers owned by insiders that do not appear in the consolidated accounts.

  • Speed over diligence

    Pressure to close before a quality-of-earnings review or confirmation round is finished.

  • Shifting accounting

    Changes in inventory method, revenue cutoff or reserve policy without a clear business reason.

Source: OCC Comptroller’s Handbook8; Willkie Farr and Gallagher2; U.S. Attorney, S.D.N.Y.1

A due-diligence failure of a different kind, in which an acquirer relied on customer data it did not independently test, is the subject of our case study on Charlie Javice and Frank.

When the numbers stop matching.

When a confirmation comes back with an exception, collections fall short or a second financier appears with a claim on the same invoices, the question changes from credit to evidence. The work then is to establish which invoices are real, where the cash went and who knew, in a form that will hold up in a bankruptcy court or a fraud action.

That is fraud examination work: tracing receipts and disbursements through every account and entity, testing invoices against customer and carrier records, reconstructing the borrowing base as it should have been reported and documenting each step. In First Brands, the transfers identified for potential litigation ran to roughly $25 billion in gross terms, which the review stressed was not a valuation of the claims.3 Volume on that scale is why method and documentation matter.

Fraud Examination Service performs this kind of analysis through its business fraud and financial investigation practice, led by an examiner who holds ACFE Board Certification Emeritus. We are not a CPA firm and do not perform audits or field exams for regulatory purposes; where an engagement needs a CPA, an appraiser or a licensed field examiner, we say so and work alongside them. Our guides on what a forensic accountant does and what a Certified Fraud Examiner is explain the differences between those roles.

If the matter is headed to litigation, the analysis has to meet the standards for expert evidence from the start; our expert witness and litigation support practice covers that stage. The First Brands case will keep producing lessons as the criminal trial and the Chapter 7 trustee’s claims proceed.

For lenders and their counsel

Six things to do before the next draw.

  1. 01

    Map every financing layer

    Require a schedule of all factoring, SCF, SPV and inventory facilities across the group, and reconcile it to the consolidated accounts.

  2. 02

    Search beyond the borrower

    Run UCC, tax lien and judgment searches on every affiliate, SPV and name variant, in each state of organization.

  3. 03

    Confirm a sample yourself

    Send positive confirmations directly to customers and receive them directly; test non-responses against cash and shipping records.

  4. 04

    Take the cash

    Put collections into a lockbox or blocked account with daily sweeps, and stop the borrower acting as sole servicer.

  5. 05

    Watch dilution and remittance lag

    Set numeric triggers for credit memos, aging shifts and days to remit that force an unscheduled exam.

  6. 06

    Get system access

    Negotiate read-only ERP and bank access and audit escalation rights at closing, when leverage is greatest.

Business fraud and financial investigations

Common questions.

Short answers. The numbered notes link to the sources.

A double-pledged receivable is a customer invoice that the borrower has sold or pledged to more than one financier at the same time, so each lender believes it has the claim to the same payment. Federal prosecutors allege that First Brands double- and triple-pledged receivables and inventory, and that Tricolor double-pledged auto loans. Both cases are allegations that have not been tried.

Only partly. A UCC search shows financing statements filed against a debtor’s exact legal name in its state of organization. It does not show amounts, does not reach affiliates or insider-owned entities filed under other names, and can miss filings with name errors. A search is a starting point that must be paired with disclosure covenants and direct verification.

The most reliable test is direct confirmation with the customers who owe the invoices, sent and received by the lender or its examiner rather than the borrower. Lenders also match invoices to purchase orders and third-party shipping records, trace cash receipts to specific invoices, and control the collection account so customer payments arrive where the lender can see them.

Cash dominion means the lender controls the account where customer payments land, usually a lockbox or blocked account swept daily to repay the loan. It lets the lender see collections directly instead of relying on the borrower’s reports, and it prevents the borrower from diverting payments that belong to the lender or factor.

Dilution is the reduction of receivables by non-cash credits such as returns, allowances, disputes, discounts and bad debts. The OCC handbook notes it usually runs at 5 percent or less of receivables. A sudden rise in dilution, or credit memos issued soon after a borrowing base date, can signal product problems or invoices that were never valid.

When collections stop matching reported sales, confirmations come back with exceptions, the borrower resists inspections or system access, or a second financier surfaces with a claim on the same collateral. A fraud examiner can trace funds, test invoices against independent records and document findings in a form that supports litigation or recovery.

Endnotes

Sources and method.

Facts were checked against each source on November 11, 2026. Primary sources were preferred: Justice Department releases, an SEC filing, the UCC text, Florida Statutes, the OCC handbook and the PCAOB standard. Criminal charges are described as allegations; guilty pleas are identified as such. Law-firm commentary is cited for disclosed figures and practice recommendations.

  1. 1U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York · January 29, 2026First Brands executives charged with multibillion-dollar fraud
  2. 2Willkie Farr and Gallagher LLP · January 28, 2026First Brands: how to avoid being two-timed by your collateral
  3. 3Nelson Mullins · September 3, 2026First Brands after conversion: what the collapse actually teaches lenders and trade creditors
  4. 4Jefferies Financial Group (SEC Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1) · October 2025Statement on Point Bonita exposure to First Brands
  5. 5Reuters · November 4, 2025First Brands accuses former CEO of misappropriating millions, perhaps billions
  6. 6Bloomberg (via Transport Topics) · March 2026First Brands CFO pleads guilty
  7. 7Bloomberg (via Transport Topics) · October 8, 2026First Brands brothers each plan to blame the other in fraud trial
  8. 8Office of the Comptroller of the Currency · March 2000, reissued March 20, 2025Comptroller’s Handbook: Accounts Receivable and Inventory Financing
  9. 9Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School · Current textUniform Commercial Code §9-109, scope
  10. 10Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School · Current textUniform Commercial Code §9-310, when filing required to perfect
  11. 11Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School · Current textUniform Commercial Code §9-322, priorities among conflicting security interests
  12. 12The Florida Senate · 2025Florida Statutes §679.322, priorities among conflicting security interests
  13. 13Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School · Current textUniform Commercial Code §9-502, contents of financing statement
  14. 14Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School · Current textUniform Commercial Code §9-301, law governing perfection and priority
  15. 15Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School · Current textUniform Commercial Code §9-307, location of debtor
  16. 16Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School · Current textUniform Commercial Code §9-506, effect of errors or omissions
  17. 17Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School · Current textUniform Commercial Code §9-515, duration and effectiveness of financing statement
  18. 18Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School · Current textUniform Commercial Code §9-406, discharge of account debtor
  19. 19Public Company Accounting Oversight Board · Effective for fiscal years ending on or after June 15, 2025AS 2310: The Auditor’s Use of Confirmation
  20. 20Association of Certified Fraud Examiners · 2026Occupational Fraud 2026: A Report to the Nations
  21. 21U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York · December 17, 2025CEO, CFO, COO charged in connection with billion-dollar collapse of Tricolor Auto
  22. 22House of Commons Treasury Committee · July 20, 2021Lessons from Greensill Capital (HC 151), chapter 2
  23. 23Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · November 7, 2025Financial Stability Report